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YANG QUANHIE
A LONG INTERVAL between marriage and the couple's first birth-the first birth interval-was one of the most prominent features of the Chinese demographic regime before the 1970s. In spite of a very low rate of contraceptive prevalence, ' Chinese married couples on average did not have their first birth quickly. The mean length of the first birth interval was well over two and a half years for all couples, and over three years for rural couples.2 Such behavior is in apparent contradiction to Chinese cultural norms. The purpose of marriage in Chinese tradition is first and foremost to produce an heir. Couples are under strong social pressure to have a child, especially a son, as soon as possible. The long first birth interval, therefore, poses an interesting puzzle for the study of the relationship between actual and ideal demographic behavior.3
During the past three decades, especially after 1970, the first birth interval in China has shortened considerably. Its mean length dropped from around 34 months in the 1950s to less than 18 months in the 1980s. Concurrently, overall fertility declined sharply and age at first marriage rose. The divergent trends of marriage age and first birth interval are shown in Figure 1 . During the 16-year period 1970-85, female mean age at first marriage rose from below 20 to over 22 years, and mean length of the first birth interval dropped from 27 to 16 months. 4 It is tempting to hypothesize a direct link between the shortening of the first birth interval and the rising age at marriage, and to attribute both to the Chinese government's family planning program, which is believed to have played a dominant role in raising marriage age and restricting fertility (Tien 1992) . Under the influence of this policy, couples would seek to bear their first child soon after marriage, in order to compensate for their late start and to ensure that they would have enough time to bear another child should the first die or become disabled. The causal links, however, are more complicated. In this article we argue that while marriage age was clearly affected by government policy, the reduction in the first birth interval was not simply a compensating behavior for late marriage. Rather, shortening of the first birth interval in China, as in many other developing countries, was propelled by broad social changes: a fundamental transformation in the marriage system; a massive expansion in formal education and nonfamilial employment, both largely supported by the socialist state; and a significant change in young couples' sexual behavior, unintentionally assisted by the government family planning program that widely disseminated information on matters of sexuality and reproduction. Significant reduction in the first birth interval in China and evidence of the rise of premarital sexual activity that we document and analyze in this article point to a transformation in patterns of sexual behavior in a country with a strong cultural tradition emphasizing female chastity.
Our exploration is carried out in the following way. We decompose the first birth interval into two parts-births likely to have resulted from conception before marriage and births that resulted from conception after marriage-to document changes in the frequency of young women's premarital sexual relations. We test our initial hypothesis that the decline in the first birth interval is an outcome of late marriage. Specifically, we examine the characteristics of married women and their husbands that are associated with a higher likelihood of their having engaged in premarital sex and with shorter first birth intervals. If shorter intervals are predominantly a catch-up effect of late marriage, we would expect a positive relationship between age at first marriage and the likelihood of premarital sexthose married later being more likely to have engaged in premarital sex. Furthermore, we would think that once we control for age at marriage, such individual characteristics as educational attainment and residence type would not have a noticeable effect on premarital sexual behavior. Finally, if shortened first birth intervals are mostly a compensation for later marriage, we would expect to find a negative relationship between age at first marriage and length of the first birth interval-those married later having shorter birth intervals. Again, we would expect that once age at marriage is controlled for, there should be little variation among couples in the length of the first birth interval.
Definitions and data
We identify three possible sequences leading to a first birth: (1) marital conception: marriage-conception-first birth; (2) premarital conception: conception-marriage-first birth; and (3) premarital birth: conception-birthmarriage.5 In China, the occurrence of type three is extremely rare.6 The present study focuses on the first two sequences.
Lacking direct evidence from surveys concerning premarital sexual behavior in China, we define birth intervals of 0-8 months between date of first marriage and first birth as outcomes of premarital conceptions. Since our data contain information about the date and outcome of first pregnancy, first pregnancies ended by induced abortion before marriage are also treated as cases of premarital conception. Births that occurred nine months or later following marriage are treated as marriage-conceptionbirth sequences; these accounted for the majority of cases in China.
Although accurate reporting of the date of first birth is facilitated by using 12 animals to denote the year in which a person is born (Coale 1984; Banister 1987) , there is no guarantee that age at marriage is accurately reported in China. A pertinent concern here is the possible time lag between the marriage ceremony (after which, according to social custom, the married couple can live together) and marriage registration (official marriage).7 In past years, given the state-enforced late age at marriage, couples in rural China sometimes married socially and then registered officially when they reached the minimum prescribed marriage age. This prac-tice, however, has largely disappeared since the early 1980s, following the relaxation of government policy. Moreover, by the time our data were collected in 1988, those who, in the 1970s, had married before the government-required minimum age had already had the opportunity to register their real date of marriage, namely the date of their social marriage. The differences between official and actual marriage dates, therefore, should not affect the findings in this article.8
Our study uses data from China's Two-per-Thousand Fertility and Birth Control Survey of 1988. The survey was conducted by China's State Family Planning Commission; the reference date was midnight 30 June 1988. The representative sample of approximately 500,000 households covered all provinces and autonomous regions of the country except Taiwan (Li 1990; Zhao 1990) . Household data, including date of birth and age at marriage, are available for all members of sample households. A complete pregnancy and contraceptive history was obtained for all ever-married women aged 15-57. The present study uses a 10 percent subsample of the Two-perThousand Survey consisting of 46,233 ever-married women aged 15-57. To minimize selectivity bias in a retrospective survey, and to limit the period of coverage, our analysis selects only marriage cohorts from 1965 to 1988, yielding 34,278 ever-married women.
Trends in premarital conception and the first birth interval Table 1 shows the probability of premarital conception and means and percentiles of age at first marriage and first birth intervals for ever-married women in China, 1950-88.9 Although the conditional probability of premarital conception is low in China, an increasing trend over time is evident: from 0.015 in the 19 50s to about 0.03 in the late 1970s and around 0.05 in the mid-1980s. By the mid-1980s, in other words, 5 out of every 100 pregnancies were conceived before marriage. This may well be an underestimate, given that premarital abortions are greatly underreported.'0
The reduction in the first birth interval in China over the past four decades has been pronounced. About 90 percent of Chinese couples have their first birth within the first three years of marriage, but the timing has shifted considerably closer to the date of marriage. Mean length of the first birth interval declined from 34 months in the 1950s to about 20 months in the 1970s and less than 18 months in the early 1980s. The most noticeable change is indicated by the mean interval by which 75 percent of all women had their first birth. For early cohorts, it was over three years, whereas for the most recent marriage cohorts it is about a year and a half. The narrowing standard deviations of the means over time suggest a more homoge- neous pattern of behavior among the recent marriage cohorts. On average, the length of transition from marriage to parenthood has shortened by about one and a half years since the 1950s. Both the increasing trend in premarital conception and the decreasing trend in the first birth interval are accompanied by increased age at first marriage since the 1950s. In the 1950s and 1960s, most women married in their late teens. The introduction of the rigorous family planning program in the early 1970s brought about a continuous increase in age at first marriage. The wan-xi-shao (later marriage, longer spacing, and fewer children) regimen of the 1970s raised women's mean age at first marriage to the early twenties, and that age peaked at 22.6 years in 1979 when the one-child policy was announced. Age at first marriage declined to about 22 years in 1981 and about 21 years in the late 1980s, following a relaxation permitted by the 1980 New Marriage Law. This decline in marriage age, however, did not reverse the upward trend of premarital conceptions, nor did it interrupt the downward trend in the length of first birth intervals.
Changes in the pattern of the first birth interval are further illustrated in Figure 2 , which shows the monthly probability of an ever-married woman having a child within three years of marriage for five marriage cohorts. The patterns for the first two cohorts (1965-69 and 1970-74) are similar, with a relatively low monthly probability of birth maintained throughout the second and third years of marriage. By comparison, among the more recent (post-1975) marriage cohorts, first births peaked sharply after one year of marriage and also exhibit an overall higher probability during the second year of marriage. Yet the most remarkable differences are observed for the monthly probability of birth just before and after nine months of marriage. The probability of having a birth jumped from below 0.05 at the eighth month after marriage to 0.17 at the tenth month for the 1965-69 marriage cohort and to 0.29 for the most recent cohort . Such a marked increase in conception shortly after marriage is prob- ably attributable to a substantial increase in coital frequency among newlyweds. We analyze this point in more detail in the following sections.
Determinants of premarital conception
Premarital sex is socially disapproved of in China and brings on strong social sanctions (Elvin 1984; Sun 1981) . Whereas a substantial literature points to the widespread prevalence of premarital fertility in Europe before the industrial revolution (Laslett 1977; Shorter, Knodel, and van de Walle 1971; Wrigley 1969 ) and in many parts of the contemporary world (Barrett 1980; Hartley 1975) , premarital sex has only very recently become more prevalent in China." Our analysis of the determinants of premarital conception and the first birth interval is limited by the range of explanatory variables available in the survey. We chose the following as our control or independent variables: residence type, ethnicity, age at marriage, marriage cohort, respondent's (woman's) educational attainment, age difference between husband and wife, and couple's social status, measured by their occupation at the time of the survey.
We expect urban origin, compared with rural origin, to be associated with a higher probability of premarital conception and a shorter first birth interval, while ethnic minorities, compared with the Han majority, should have a lower probability of premarital conception and longer birth intervals, partly because of different population policies applied to China's ethnic minorities. Age at first marriage and marriage cohort are included as demographic control variables.'2 We expect that late age at marriage and more recent marriage cohorts are more likely to be associated with premarital conception and shorter first birth intervals. Respondent's educational attainment is divided into three levels: illiterate and semi-literate; primary school; and secondary school and above. The first category is the reference group. We assume that those with higher educational levels are more likely to work in the modern sector, to have love marriages, and to have an increased probability of premarital and early marital conceptions.
We also constructed a variable showing the age difference between wife and husband. Because society tends to blame women much more than men in the case of premarital conceptions, we assume that women are more aware of the possible consequences of premarital pregnancy. Women older than their male partners may have more say than younger women in their relationships with men. If the wife is older than her husband, she may be in a better position to prevent premarital sexual activity, and may also have a lower incidence of premarital pregnancy.-Couples' social status was classified into five categories: (1) wife and husband are both farners; (2) wife is a farmer and husband a nonfarmer; (3) husband is a farmer and wife a nonfarmer; (4) wife and husband are both nonfarmers and nonprofessionals; and (5) both are professionals.'4 The ordinal sequence of the categories also implies increasing social status of couples (Bauer et al. 1992) . Higher social status is expected to increase the incidence of premarital conception and decrease the first birth interval.'5 Table 2 shows the percent distribution of the independent variables used in logistic regression of premarital conceptions.'6 The proportion of premarital conceptions is higher in urban than in rural areas. Ethnicity makes no difference in the probability of premarital conception. The prevalence of premarital conception increases monotonically with marriage cohort, from 1.3 percent in the 1965-69 cohort to 4.4 percent in the 1985-88 cohort. The incidence of premarital conception is greater among women who married after age 20 than among those who married earlier. It is not clear, however, whether this difference is due to marriage age or is actually a cohort effect: women in early marriage cohorts married earlier and also had a lower incidence of premarital conception. Higher educational levels of the wife are associated with a higher probability of premarital conception. It seems that if the wife is older than her husband, the probability of conception before marriage is lower than if the husband is older. The probability of premarital conception for couples who both hold professional jobs is more than twice that for couples in which both husband and wife are farmers. Table 3 presents five models of logistic regression of the determinants of premarital conception. In Model 1, we include only age at marriage, controlling for residence and ethnicity, to test the effect of increased age at marriage on premarital conception. Without controlling for other variables, age at marriage has a positive and significant effect on premarital conception. This supports the common wisdom that China's family planning program, in delaying age at marriage, has increased the incidence of premarital conceptions. In Model 2, however, the inclusion of marriage cohorts makes age at marriage an insignificant variable in determining premarital conception. In other words, the influence of age at marriage on premarital conception is completely accounted for by the effect of marriage cohorts. The incidence of premarital conceptions increases with marriage cohorts, regardless of age at marriage. The likelihood of premarital conception for the 1975-79 marriage cohort is 2.2 times (exp.(.806)) higher than for the 1965-69 cohort (the reference group). And for the most recent marriage cohort it is about 3.6 times (exp. (1.274)) higher than for the 1965-69 cohort. Urban respondents are nearly twice as likely to have a premarital conception as rural respondents.
The positive and significant effect of women's educational attainment on premarital conception is shown in Model 3. Women with primary and higher education are twice as likely to conceive before marriage as the illiterate and semi-literate. Better-educated women are more likely to work in the modern sector, less likely to be influenced by traditional values, and more inclined to adopt permissive attitudes toward premarital sexuality, reflecting changing social norms. After controlling for women's education, women who married very late (at age 24 years or more) tend to have a lower incidence of premarital conception. This suggests that women's maturity reduces premarital sexuality. The fact that women who were older than or the same age as their husbands have a lower probability of premarital conception (Model 4) also supports this hypothesis. Older women may be more conscious than men of the possible consequences of premarital conception, since they have to bear most of the blame should it occur.
The full model (Model 5) includes the couple's social status as a variable. Higher social status is strongly associated with a greater probability of premarital conception. Controlling for such factors as marriage cohort and educational attainment, nonfarming couples have a premarital conception rate 1.4 times higher than farming couples, while professional couples are 1.6 times more likely than farming couples to have a premarital conception. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that modern-sector employment is associated with a higher probability of premarital conception. Our findings contradict the accepted wisdom that later marriage age as a result of the government's family planning program has led to an increased likelihood of premarital conception. The increased incidence of premarital conception is, rather, associated with broad socioeconomic changes that have taken place in China, especially since the late 1970s.
Detenrinants of the first bith interval
In traditional China, not only was premarital sex socially prohibited, but the conduct of married couples that might lead to the early development of an intimate relationship was also restricted. On the one hand, newly married couples were expected to have children soon after marriage to continue the family line. On the other hand, young couples had to avoid intimacy and physical contact in front of family members or in public (Wang and Huei 1969) . As suggested by Goode (1963) and Macfarlane (1986) , in societies where wider kin interests dominate, arranged marriages and structural factors in the marital household discourage the quick formation of an intimate relationship between young spouses.
Since 1949, China has introduced a series of measures to improve women's status and educational levels and to lift restrictions imposed on women. In 1950, for example, the state banned arranged marriage and legalized women's inheritance rights. In part as a result, the proportion of love marriages, particularly in urban areas, has increased (Parish and Whyte 1978; Wolf and Huang 1980; Whyte and Parish 1984; Whyte 1990) .
In studying the first birth interval, we agree with the proposition that "there is no direct path from socioeconomic variable to birth interval dynamics; there are only indirect effects through the proximate variables" (Rindfuss, Palmore, and Bumpass 1987: 814) . We present some indirect evidence, in the form of proportional hazards, for effects of social change on coital frequency and on consequent differences in timing of the first birth interval within marriage.'7 Table 4 shows life-table percentiles and means of first birth intervals for ever-married women by marriage cohort and socioeconomic charac-teristics. The variables and coding used here and in the proportional hazard models are the same as those used in the previous section. A difference in mean length of the first birth interval between urban and rural women is apparent. On average, urban women experience their transition from marriage to parenthood about four months earlier than rural women. A difference between Han Chinese and minorities in the timing of first birth is also evident, with minority women having their first child about four months later. As the percentage of premarital conceptions increases with marriage cohort, the means of first birth intervals decrease markedly. Women who married in the 1980s have a first birth about twice as fast as those who married in the 1960s. Late marriage tends to shorten the first birth interval, but women who married very late (at age 24+) tend to have slightly longer birth intervals than those married at ages 20-23.
Women's higher educational attainment is associated with shorter birth intervals. Among women with secondary or higher education, the mean length of the first birth interval is about six months shorter than that of women with little education. Nonprofessional couples who worked in sectors other than agriculture tend to have the shortest birth intervals. Finally, the longest birth intervals are observed among couples where the wife is older than the husband, or the husband is older than the wife by five or more years. Couples of similar ages tend to have shorter birth intervals.
The results of a multivariate analysis are presented in Table 5 , in the form of five hazard models. Model 1 shows the effect of age at first marriage on the relative probability of first birth, controlling for residence and ethnicity. The results are similar to those for premarital conception, with women who married late having a higher monthly probability of giving birth. Controlling for other variables, minority women have longer birth intervals than Han women, which may reflect the fact that less stringent family planning program regulations have been applied to minority populations in China since the 1970s (Greenhalgh 1986 ). In Models 2 to 5, other demographic and socioeconomic variables are added to the analysis in the same sequence as in the logistic regression analysis of premarital conception. Unlike the case for premarital conception, age at first marriage has a persistent positive and significant effect on the first birth interval, even after controlling for the effects of other variables. Women who married late have shorter birth intervals, although, as suggested by the changes in the magnitude of the coefficients, the relationship may not be linear. For instance, the coefficient increases from .152 for women married at ages 20-21 to .240 for women married at 22-23 and then decreases to .232 for women married at age 24 and older (Model 5).
Women in more recent marriage cohorts and with higher educational attainment have shorter birth intervals. In the full model (Model 5), we add the variables of husband's and wife's age difference and couple's social status. Couples where the husband is older than the wife tend to have shorter birth intervals. The inclusion of a couple's social status makes urban versus rural residence of the respondent an insignificant variable, probably reflecting the overlap of a couple's social status with their residence. For example, most of the respondents in the "both farmers" category live in rural areas, while most of "other" and "professional" respondents live in urban areas.
If shorter birth intervals are mainly a catch-up effect of later marriages, we would expect a positive relationship between age at marriage and the length of the first birth interval. Furthermore, we would not expect individuals' social characteristics to be associated with variation in birth intervals. Whereas we see only some evidence for the former, the latter is clearly not the case for China. Shorter first birth intervals among the well educated and among those who work in modern sectors suggest alternative explanations for the changed timing of first birth intervals.
Discussion and conclusion
Over the past three decades, a significant change in sexual behavior has been underway in the People's Republic of China. Premarital sex, strictly prohibited in China's past, is now part of the social scene. Within marriage, the first birth interval, which once stood at 34 months, has been reduced by half. Along with an unprecedented fertility decline, paradoxically, the pace of reaching parenthood after marriage has been hastened greatly. The late marriage age prescribed by government policy has to an extent precipitated couples' childbearing after marriage, but official policy on age at marriage was not the predominant factor. Our study suggests that shorter first birth intervals are an outcome of increased sexual activity among young couples, independent of the effect of later marriage. Increased coital frequency among the young, both unmarried and married, is probably the major proximate factor contributing to these far-reaching changes.'8
What kinds of social transformations in China have propelled changes in young couples' sexual behavior? We believe four changes were instrumental.
First and most important is the decisive shift away from arranged marriages. Nearly half a century ago, most marriages in China were arranged by parents or other family elders. Marriage was primarily intended to serve family kinship, not to satisfy individual desires. With the direct intervention of the state, both in the form of law and in a series of political campaigns aimed at eradicating so-called feudal influences, fewer and fewer marriages are based on parental arrangements. By the late twentieth century, the frequency of arranged marriages had declined dramatically.'9
The decline in arranged marriages has been accompanied by increased attraction and intimacy between bride and groom at the time of marriage.20 Under the arranged marriage system, the new wife almost invariably moved into the house of the husband, beginning her marital life in a strange and often forbidding environment. It was not uncommon for the bride and groom to meet each other for the first time on the day of the marriage ceremony. Among the admonitions given by a mother to her son and new daughter-in-law was restraint from excessive sex, which was believed to deplete the male's strength.2' In parts of China, local custom also stipulated that the new bride could return to the natal home for extended periods, ranging from several months to a year, to spend time with her own parents. These several factors no doubt resulted in low coital frequency and thus in a long first birth interval.22
A second, related change is the rapid increase in formal education and in nonfamilial employment in both urban and rural China. The Chinese socialist state has sponsored and promoted a rapid expansion of public education and created nonfamilial employment on a scale unprecedented in the country's history.23 Until the late 1970s, the employment rate of urban Chinese women was among the highest in the world, and large numbers of rural women were also organized to participate in agricultural production in people's communes (Bauer et al. 1992; Whyte 1984; Whyte and Parish 1984) . Such changes have altered the power balance between generations and genders, creating opportunities for young people to meet face to face. As shown by the results of this study, urban and more-educated women have both the highest rate of occurrence of premarital sex and the shortest first birth intervals. Better-educated young people are more likely to meet and find their own spouses-to-be,24 and such relationships, both before and after marriage, are associated with greater intimacy. Compared with rural couples, newlyweds in urban areas are also much more likely to establish their own households after marriage, instead of living with their (usually the groom's) parents.25
The third factor contributing to the change in young couples' sexual behavior in China is the rapid alteration in norms regarding sexuality that has occurred in the past 15 years. Along with China's opening to the outside world and the gradual withdrawal of the government from the private lives of citizens, exposure to matters related to sexuality in popular literature and other media has greatly increased. Sexuality is no longer taboo in public discussion and is not presented as a matter solely of reproduction. Instead, it has been openly treated as a source of individual pleasure and satisfaction (Evans 1995) . Some even claim that China is undergoing a sexual revolution (Zha and Geng 1992) .
The fourth important social change is the government's family planning program.26 This massive effort has indirectly served as a vehicle for sex education. Given the social taboo in discussing sexuality in its own right in China before the 1980s, knowledge of sex was widely disseminated in association with information on reproduction and health (Evans 1995; Honig and Hershatter 1988) .
The largest decline in the length of the first birth interval in the past two decades occurred in the countryside, where the majority of Chinese reside. It is well known that the success of China's family planning pro-gram is attributable to its extensive organizational structure and outreach. In every village, the message emphasizing the importance of family planning and contraceptive knowledge is repeatedly heard. Knowledge of contraceptive options entails knowledge about reproduction; family planning education is also sex education.27 Indeed, the most rapid decline in the first birth interval occurred starting from the 1 970s, coinciding with the spread of the family planning program. This is another instance where government action appears to have produced unintended consequences.
The increased intimacy and sexual activity between couples, both before and following marriage, do not, at least as yet, signal the kind of 'sexual revolution" witnessed in the West especially since the 1960s. Young people in China may start having sexual relations before marriage, but in most cases they do so with their future spouse and only when marriage is already in sight. While we cannot support this claim with direct evidence from mainland China, survey data from Taiwan have documented such a pattern (Chang 1994) .
In an influential study, Rindfuss and Morgan (1983) argued that the rising proportion of early marital conceptions in three Asian societies (Korea, Malaysia, and Taiwan) was the result of an increase in the rate of coital frequency early in marriage, which had resulted from the movement from traditional arranged marriages to love marriages. They concluded that a quiet but profound sexual revolution was taking place in Asia. With a slight time lag, China, with its much larger population, has now joined this revolution.
What makes China different from other Asian societies, however, is the role played by the socialist state. What has occurred in China is not simply another case to validate the claimed consequences of modernization or westernization. On the contrary, the Chinese socialist state has been a main agent in promoting broad and far-reaching social changes: promulgating marriage laws and policies, expanding formal education and employment, and implementing a forceful family planning program. These actions have paved the way for a marked shift not only in reproductive, but also, unintentionally, in sexual behavior.
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1 The proportion of ever-married women who had ever used any contraceptive method by age 30-34 was 9 percent in 1965 and 16 percent in 1969. One can safely assume that most of these women started using contraception only after at least their first birth. These numbers are calculated from China's 1988 Two-per-Thousand Fertility and Birth Control Survey. (Flinn 1981: 33) .
3 The unusually long interval between marriage and first birth was first empirically documented for all China in the late 1980s by Coale, Li, and Han (1988) . Using data from China's first large demographic survey, they studied the distribution of interbirth intervals in rural China from the 1940s to the 1970s and observed the low conception rates following marriage as the most surprising feature. They suggested that lower fecundability in earlier years may have resulted from obeying traditional restraints on coital frequency, and that coresidence of bride and groom delayed for several years may have depressed fertility early in marriage. Moderate to low marital fertility, largely a result of long birth intervals, has also been observed in China prior to the current century. A study of the Qing (1644-1911) imperial lineage suggests the presence of a second type of preventive check, namely fertility control within marriage (Wang, Lee, and Campbell 1995) .
4 The mean age at first marriage rose by three years, from 19.7 in 1970 to 22.6 by 1979. It dropped afterward to 21.3 by 1984, due to the relaxation in 1980 of the government's late marriage policy. Even after the decline in the 1980s, mean female marriage age was still close to two years higher than its pre-1970 level.
5 Bastardy-that is, birth outside marriage-does not appear in the data we use for our analysis, but see Barrett (1980) . 6 In our 10 percent sample of the 1988 Two-per-Thousand Fertility Survey of China, among some 30,000 cases there are only 29 instances of negative birth intervals between first marriage and first birth. Those cases were eliminated from the analysis.
7 Our data do not allow us to distinguish these two events. Such time lags, if they existed on a large scale, may generate misleading results. For instance, if the interval between marriage registration and ceremony is likely to be longer for older marriage cohorts than for younger ones, and if respondents report the date of marriage registration as the marriage date, we would observe artificially longer first birth intervals for the older marriage cohorts. On the other hand, if the older marriage cohorts are more inclined to report the date of marriage ceremony as the marriage date, it may increase the estimated incidence of premarital conception and decrease the first birth interval of this cohort by moving the marriage date closer to the date of the first birth.
8 Our results will show that the incidence of both premarital sex and shorter birth intervals is more likely to be associated with urban areas, where the discrepancy between dates of registration and ceremony hardly exists.
9 The estimates were obtained by lifetable procedures, a suitable safeguard to ensure that selectivity bias was not responsible for the observed trend.
10 A study of induced abortion among unmarried women in Shanghai city shows that the proportion of abortions to single women increased from 14 percent of all abortions in 1982 to 28 percent in 1985 and 25 percent in 1988 (Wu et al. 1992) . Given that premarital abortions are probably underreported, the actual number of premarital pregnancies in China, particularly in the recent past, may well be higher than what we observed from survey data.
11 The lower incidence of premarital conception in Asian countries, especially in China, has been attributed to the strong influence of traditional culture and to lower levels of socioeconomic development, both of which restricted young people's premarital conduct (Barrett 1980; Croll 1981; Yang 1959) . Goode (1963) and others have argued that there is an emergent trend toward similar marriage and family structure throughout the world as a result of modernization, industrialization, and urbanization. Under this assumption, other things being equal, couples' participation in modern sectors of a society should lead to a greater incidence of premarital conception. Studies of other Asian countries' premarital behavior, how-ever, provide no evidence to support this hypothesis (Hirschman and Rindfuss 1982) .
12 Age at first marriage is divided into four groups according to the approximate percentiles of age at first marriage: about 30 percent of women married before or at age 19, about 50 percent before or at age 21, 75 percent married before age 24, and the rest married at or after age 24. Three dummy variables are created, with marriage age 19 or less used as the reference group. Four dummy variables are created for marriage cohorts, with the 1965-69 cohort as the reference category.
13 Four dummy variables are created to represent husband-wife age differences, with wife older than husband as the reference group.
14 There are nine occupational categories in the survey: 1, farmer primarily in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, and fishery; 2, farmer in industry, transportation, and construction; 3, farmer in commerce and service industry (including white collar workers in villages); 4, worker in cities/ towns; 5, farming, forestry, animal husbandry, fishery worker (nonfarmer); 6, business, commerce, service worker; 7, cadres, party and government, management, and intellectuals; 8, student; and 9, others. Our category "both farmers' includes only the first occupational category in the survey. 'Both other' includes all categories except the first. The professionals include categories 6 and 7 in the survey.
15 There are four dummies of couples' social status, with "both are farmers" as the reference group. It should be pointed out that couples' social status should be a timevarying variable. In the present study, we use respondent's occupation at time of survey as an approximate indication of respondent's occupation at time of first birth. Given the low occupational mobility in China, and our very broad categories of social status, it is not unreasonable to assume the present occupation as a time-invariant variable.
16 We use discrete-time methods of event history analysis, employing logistic regression to estimate the multivariate models of premarital conceptions in China. The statistical literature has analyzed decisions about duration of time within the framework of either discrete-time or continuous-time hazard models (Allison 1984; Agresti 1990; Lancaster 1990; Yamaguchi 1991) . The discrete-time hazard models are flexible and relatively easy to apply (Guilkey and Rindfuss 1987) . A binary dependent variable is coded as 1 if the interval between marriage and first birth is 0-8 months and 0 otherwise.
17 We employ Cox's proportional hazard model to estimate the covariates of first birth intervals (Cox and Oakes 1983) . The results from the discrete-time hazard analysis of first birth intervals (not shown) are consistent with those of the continuous-time Cox's model. We present the estimates of Cox's model for its simplicity in number of coefficients. The cases of premarital conception are excluded from the analysis of first birth intervals. Each case included in this analysis either ends with the birth of the first child, or is truncated at 120 months after marriage, or is censored at the time of the interview. We divide durations between marriage and first birth (in months) into four segments for the analysis of discrete-time hazard models: 9-12, 13-18, 19-24, 25-72. More than 95 percent of ever-married women had their first child within five years (60 months) of marriage.
18 The effect of other major "proximate" determinants of fertility, such as contraceptive use, abortion, and postpartum infecundability, are not applicable in explaining the changes described here. Another possible cause is the increase in nutritional levels in recent decades, which may lead to higher fecundability among Chinese couples. We do not believe this latter explanation applies, as it has been well documented that nutrition above famine or starvation levels is not a significant determinant of fecundability (John, Menken, and Chowdhury 1987) .
19 While a clear transition has occurred in marriage practice, parental influence in marriage decisions has by no means disappeared. The important difference is, however, that young couples are at least consulted for their opinion before a marriage is finalized, if the parents take the initiative to make the match. Most young people who have found their own matches also seek the approval of their parents. Arranged marriages via a matchmaker and purchase marriages have been banned by the government.
Many recent surveys have reported the decline of arranged marriages in China. For instance, a survey of urban residents in the southwest city of Chengdu found that arranged marriages accounted for 69 percent of those married between 1933 and 1948 and for 22 percent of those married between 1949 and 1957, but had totally disappeared by the 1960s (Whyte 1990) . Another survey in a northern Chinese city, Baoding, revealed a similar trend, with arranged marriages declining from 44 percent of marriages before 1957 to virtually nil after the 1960s. (These numbers are from an ongoing collaborative project between the University of Michigan and Peking University on urban family dynamics in China.) In the predominantly rural provinces of Hebei and Shaanxi, the percentage of arranged marriages dropped from 27 and 48 (respectively) for those married in the 1950s to 3 and 12 in the early 1980s (State Statistical Bureau 1986) . 20 In the Chengdu survey cited in note 19, only 17 percent of married respondents whose marriage occurred before 1948 reported retrospectively that they were 'completely in love" at the time of the marriage, compared with 67 percent of those married between 1977 and 1987 (Whyte 1990) .
21 Such advice to observe moderation in sexual actitivites was not only found in many classic medical and personal health texts (cited in Wang, Lee, and Campbell 1995; also see Furth 1994) , but was also common in the medical literature well into the 1950s (Evans 1995) .
22 Wolf and Huang's (1980) pioneering research on marriage type and fertility differences in Taiwan vividly illustrates the association between lack of passion experienced by couples and lower marital fertility.
23 The percentage of the population that was illiterate or semi-literate decreased from over 60 for those born in the first quarter of the century to 18 for females and 4.5 for males born in the early 1960s (Wang and Tuma 1993) .
24 According to a survey of ever-married women aged 20 to 54 in six provinces, 14 percent of rural women with a primary school education met their husbands directly, compared with 20 percent of rural women with a senior high school education. Among urban respondents, the numbers are 33 percent for those with primary school education and 54 percent for the university educated (Institute of Population Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 1994).
25 The survey cited in note 24 reports that 58 percent of urban couples (aged 20 to 54) established a new residence at the time of their marriage, whereas only 28 percent of rural couples were able to do so. Relatedly, 32 percent of urban brides moved into their husbands' parents' household, but 65 percent of rural brides did so.
26 Under current Chinese family planning policies, in most places couples can have an additional birth to replace a child who has died (see, for example, Greenhalgh 1986) . Under the one-child policy in urban areas and the two-child policy in most rural areas, it is to the couple's advantage to have a birth early so they can be eligible to have another child if the previous one dies.
27 There have been reports that in some locales even the menstrual schedule of women of reproductive age is posted on a public bulletin board.
